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Commonwealth of Massachusetts



House Post Audit and Oversight Committee

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Management Review:

MASSACHUSETTS NATIONAL GUARD

House of Representatives

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HOUSE POST AUDIT BUREAU

Richard F. Tobin, Jr.
Director

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

House of Representatives

The Massachusetts National Guard

House Post Audit and Oversight Committee

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Upon examination of the Massachusetts National Guard's manpower policy and armory usage, specifically practices of recruitment, retention and building utilization, the House Post Audit and Oversight Bureau finds the following:

1. The Massachusetts Army National Guard (ARNG) continually encounters difficulty in meeting its authorized strength levels, usually not reaching more than 95% of this authorized level.
2. The problem of reaching authorized strength levels appears to be in the process of becoming more pronounced, with a steady decline in numbers of troops evident for the past three fiscal years.
3. National survey data collected by HPAO indicate that Massachusetts is less capable of meeting its manpower targets than many other states.
4. While the Massachusetts ARNG tuition assistance program is one of the most generous of its kind in the nation, only about 12% of all state military personnel take advantage of the program. Data collected nationally appear to indicate that the link between recruitment and educational benefits is weak. The stronger correlations are between recruitment and unemployment, urbanization and education.
5. Despite the underutilization of the Massachusetts ARNG tuition assistance program, it serves to induce at least some enlistees to join the Guard, while providing an incentive for others to stay in the Guard. The program itself is of negligible cost to the taxpayers.
6. Recruiting in Massachusetts is hampered by the Commonwealth's healthy economy, which serves to remove part of the economic rationale for military service. National data bear this conclusion out, showing that states with high unemployment tend to be more fortunate in filling manpower targets. Similarly, Massachusetts high urbanization and high levels of educational attainment also serve as an obstacle to effective recruiting.
7. Massachusetts recruiters are hampered by the negative image of military service many citizens of the Commonwealth apparently hold. This is compounded by the fact that the Mass ARNG is primarily a combat arms organization, a branch of service which traditionally has trouble attracting recruits.
8. One of the chief problems of retention in the Mass ARNG is the disturbing pattern of AWOL violations resulting in discharges. It is clear that many Guardsmen count on being discharged from the ARNG by not coming to assigned duty.
9. Contrary to popularly-held images, many Guardsmen leave the Guard not because of combat training, but in spite of it. HPAO interviewers were told that field exercises are a strong attraction to many part-time Guard members.

10. The Commonwealth's armory system is bloated by the presence of several large, expensive, underutilized and dilapidated buildings, in a number significantly exceeding that needed for efficient basing of Guard units.

11. Many Massachusetts armories are more often utilized as cheap athletic facilities than as military structures. These uses, while not unpermissible, change the character of the armory system from a group of bases from which the ARNG fulfills Federal or State missions to one of a chain of civic centers.

12. Several opportunities exist for a coherent and comprehensive plan of armory regionalization; otherwise, age and decay force the process of armory replacement to become piecemeal and disjointed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recruitment into the Massachusetts ARNG would be aided by a greater public awareness and better public image of the Guard itself. To this end, the Commonwealth should consider increasing advertising aimed at Guard recruitment, as well as the sponsorship of events such as "National Guard Week," etc.
2. Legislation requiring public high schools in the Commonwealth to provide lists of graduating students to Guard recruiters should be enacted, as these recruiting personnel are often hindered by uncooperative school administrators.
3. Retain the Massachusetts National Guard Educational Assistance Program.
4. Increase the ability of the Guard to punish AWOL violators with overnight jail sentences, by having the Commonwealth monitor the compliance of local police departments with Guard requests for an arrest. A program of ARNG-employer coordination may also be helpful in this respect.
5. Increase the penalties for AWOL discharges, perhaps including a fine rather than simple discharge. At the very least, AWOL discharges should be classified as "dishonorable" rather than the present "general" classification.
6. The Mass ARNG should be more selective in its recruitment, weeding out potential AWOLs before they are inducted, through more selective testing and interview procedures.
7. Several Massachusetts armories should be closed; the exact location of the armories to be phased out should be determined by the State Quartermaster. Units located therein should be regionally consolidated.
8. Larger, regional armories should be constructed, with at least three units per facility. This would ensure a more constant and cost efficient use of the facility.
9. Armories to be closed should be either turned over to the municipality where located, or sold subject to the provisions of Chapter 579 of the Acts of 1980.

FOREWORD

The House Post Audit and Oversight Bureau was established by Chapter 351, Section 282 of the Acts of 1981. The Bureau conducts performance and program audits under the direction of the House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight.


This report evaluates manpower problems in the Massachusetts National Guard, and the utilization of the Guard's armory system. The report uses a comparative method, based on data gained from questionnaires the Bureau sent to each state militia in the country. The Commonwealth's manning and armory practices are evaluated in light of the experiences of other state National Guard organizations.

The report also details the effectiveness of the Massachusetts armories.

We would like to thank the many members of the Massachusetts National Guard who aided HPAO personnel at all stages of this report. Mr. Robert Connors of the Boston HQ detachment was especially helpful in assisting HPAO auditors in obtaining information and answering inquiries. We also wish to thank the state Armorers who were most helpful to HPAO interviewers during on-site visits across the state.

The level of response to our questionnaire was excellent, and we are indebted to the many officers and enlisted personnel around the country who took the time to carefully answer our questions.

This study was supervised by Richard M. Sundstrom, Assistant Director, House Post Audit and Oversight Bureau and conducted by Thomas Nichols.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Methodology

This study evaluates the recruitment and retention practices of the Massachusetts Army National Guard, and the efficiency of the Commonwealth's current armory system. It has been, as of this writing, more than ten years since an attempt has been made to examine either of these systems. The last (and apparently only) such attempt was made in 1973-74, when the Massachusetts Senate investigated the possible effects of the abolition of the draft on the National Guard; this investigation resulted in Senate report S.1480 (1974), which also included a chapter on the future of armory utilization.

The evaluation of the Massachusetts National Guard's manpower and armory policies was conducted comparatively, using data from other states which was gained through a questionnaire (See appendix A) sent to the various state militias. The response to the questionnaire was excellent, with replies from all states with the exception of Arkansas, Colorado, Oregon, Wyoming, and Virginia. No replies were received from any U.S. territories or from the District of Columbia. HPAO concentrated on the following questions:

*How does Massachusetts compare to other states in meeting its required strength levels?

*What methods are used to recruit and retain individuals in other states, and how do these methods compare with the Commonwealth's?

*What is the state of the Commonwealth's armory system, and is it adequate for meeting the needs of the state military?

*How does Massachusetts' policy on armory usage compare with that of other states?

B. Background

The Massachusetts National Guard is the oldest military organization in the United States. In December 1636, the General Court authorized the formation of the first two militia units, which are perpetuated today as the 101st Engineer Battalion and the 182nd Infantry. In the late 17th Century, the Massachusetts Colonial Militia was composed of the North Regiment, in what is now Middlesex County; the East Regiment in the approximate area of what is now Essex County; and the South Regiment, occupying what is now Greater Boston and the South Shore. Today, Massachusetts is the home of the 26th "Yankee" Division, which is primarily an infantry organization.

The term "National Guard" was first applied to a state militia by New York State in 1824. The Eleventh Regiment of Artillery of the New York State Militia was renamed the "Battalion of National Guards" in order to honor the visiting Marquis de Lafayette, who had commanded the famous French "Garde Nationale." By the end of the Civil War, the term was in virtually universal use in the United States, although Massachusetts was one of the last states to adopt it.

Massachusetts Guardsmen have participated in all of the United States' major conflicts, either as individuals brought into Regular Army units, or as a coherent unit sent overseas. In 1918, the 104th Infantry became the first U.S. military unit to be decorated by a foreign government, when it was honored for its valor by France. This honor was again bestowed on the 104th at the end of World War II, and again by France.

C. Mission of the Guard

Like all National guard organizations, the Massachusetts National Guard is charged with a dual mission, one State and one Federal.

The Federal mission is to augment regular U.S. forces for the purpose of the national defense. Thus the Guard operates with federal equipment and trains regularly for its Federal mission, which is essentially to serve as a ready reserve of standing American military forces.

The State mission is to defend and assist communities in the Commonwealth in the event of either attack or disaster. It is hoped that state duties may augment the training given the Guardsmen for their Federal mission. During peacetime, the Guard is under the control of the Commonwealth, with the Governor as Commander-in-Chief. During wartime, or during a national emergency, Guard forces may be "Federalized" by the President of the United States at will.

Most Guard activities center around state emergencies. Table 1 shows the type and approximate cost of several major state activations since 1981.

Table 1

Major State Activations 1981-1984

<u>Event</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Personnel activated</u>	<u>Cost</u>
State employees walkout	July 9-14 1981	7460	\$564,000
Lynn fire, security	Nov.28-Dec.2 1981	1159	\$ 87,013
Snow emergency Springfield	April 6-7 1982	na	na
MBTA strike Boston	April 16-17 1982	260	\$ 18,000
Fall River fire	May 11-17 1982	259	\$ 43,000
Snow emergency statewide	Feb. 12 1983	138	\$ 8,102
Snow emergency statewide	Jan. 18-19 1984	na	na
Snow emergency Central/Eastern Massachusetts	Mar. 29-31 1984	282	\$ 22,350
Tall ships, crowd management	June 2-3 1984	194	\$ 5,293
Shirley Correc- tional Institute	July 9-Nov.30 1984	na	\$ 16,508
na = not available			
<u>Source:</u> Military Division HQ, Boston.			

This list covers only the largest operations since 1984, and is by no means a complete list of state activations. The Guard has been called upon in other circumstances, including controlling forest fires and locating missing persons as well as to assist local police forces each year during the running of the Boston Marathon.

II. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

A. Current Problems

Table 2 displays the actual strength of each state's National Guard, in comparison to their authorized force levels. The authorized level is the Federally-determined minimum strength each Guard organization is expected to maintain. It should be noted that the figures for actual strength are somewhat misleading, in that they represent the total strength of Army and Air units together. This obscures the poorer recruiting performance of the Army branches; in general, the Air Guard finds it easier to fulfill its recruitment targets because it is perceived by the recruits as a source of better training and more excitement.

The Commonwealth's recruiting problems center around the Army Guard. In FY 1983, the Army Guard had a net gain of 335 persons. In FY 1984, the ARNG went from 96.5% of its authorized strength to 95%, with a net loss of 200 persons. For the first eight months of FY 1985, the ARNG was at 93.8% of its authorized strength; in that period alone, it experienced a net loss of 487 persons.

These figures place Massachusetts in roughly the lower third of the rankings of the respondents to the HPAO questionnaire, as shown in Table 2. We turn now to causes of this reduced ability to attract and hold enlistees for the ARNG.

Table 2
Strength Level By State

<u>State:</u>	<u>actual</u>	<u>authorized</u>	<u>% of authorized</u>
North Dakota	3497	2818	124.1
Maryland	7220	6505	111.0
South Carolina	14051	12791	109.9
Michigan	11433	10418	109.7
Kentucky	7914	7224	109.6
Utah	5722	5280	108.4
Vermont	3433	3181	107.9
Georgia	10972	10346	106.1
South Dakota	4010	3799	105.6
Tennessee	13505	12863	105.0
Louisiana	9792	9364	104.6
Montana	2928	2813	104.1
North Carolina	12040	11586	103.9
Alabama	20882	20317	102.8
Mississippi	12092	11795	102.5
New York	23205	22657	102.4
Texas	19384	19057	101.7
Indiana	13005	12850	101.2
West Virginia	5550	5512	100.7
Hawaii	6181	6215	99.5
Nevada	2150	2186	98.4
Maine	3237	3288	98.4
Florida	10904	11140	97.9
Ohio	14289	14667	97.4
Pennsylvania	22013	22641	97.2
Alaska	3316	3415	97.1
New Mexico	4106	4261	96.4
Illinois	10312	10726	96.1
California	25602	26743	95.7
Massachusetts	15213	15896	95.7
Arizona	7140	7472	95.6
Idaho	2884	3020	95.5
Missouri	8586	9046	94.9
Minnesota	9784	10327	94.7
Nebraska	4454	4754	93.7
Wisconsin	8646	9248	93.5
New Jersey	12423	13419	92.6
Delaware	2325	2526	92.0
Rhode Island	2968	3251	91.3
Iowa	8720	9642	90.4
New Hampshire	2350	2660	88.3
Kansas	6328	7501	84.4
Connecticut	6212	7395	84.0

B. Recruitment

1. Programs

Massachusetts, like other states, utilizes Federal monies for National Guard recruitment incentives. These Federal programs provide for a cash bonus of \$2000, and varying degrees of educational assistance. In return, the recruit enlists for a 6 year period, 3 months of which is served on active duty for training purposes. The remainder is served one weekend per month, and 2 weeks each summer. The educational bonus is considerable: up to \$4000 in costs, and a loan repayment plan in which the U.S. government will repay up to 15% of Guardsman's student loans.

The primary state-funded incentive for recruits is the Massachusetts National Guard Educational Assistance Program, passed into law in 1978. This program provides four years of free tuition for any Massachusetts Guardsman at any state college or university. To be eligible the Guardsman must have one year left on his current enlistment. There is no additional time requirement.

2. Participation

Massachusetts ARNG authorities estimate that approximately 40-50% of the Commonwealth's Guardsmen receive some sort of Federal bonus, either as recruits or as retentions. Far fewer take advantage of the state tuition waiver. In FY 1984, 1571 guard members participated in the program, up from 1510 in 1983 and 1303 in 1982. Still, this figure represents only 12% of all eligible Guardsmen for that period. Of these participants, approximately 90% are non-prior service enlistees.

Despite these low participation figures, recruiters claim that the full tuition waiver is one of their most powerful recruiting tools. There is little reason to doubt that this is true, since Massachusetts' 12% figure compares favorably with other states' participation rates. The program itself entails almost no cost to the taxpayer, since it is assigned on a "space-available" basis. The only real costs associated with it are the increased administrative costs to the institution where the Guardsman would be enrolled.

In comparison to the other states, Massachusetts' program of tuition assistance is rather generous. Of the 30 states in the HPAO survey which offer tuition assistance, only 9 offer 100% tuition. One of those 9 limits the offer to ROTC cadets, while the others are basically open to all Guardsmen. Table 3 shows those states which offer full tuition assistance to their Guardsmen.

Table 3
States Offering Full Tuition

<u>State</u>	<u>% of authorized strength</u>
Louisiana	104.6
West Virginia	100.7
Hawaii	99.5
Ohio	97.4
Illinois	96.1
Massachusetts	95.7
Wisconsin	93.5
Kansas (ROTC only)	84.4
Connecticut	84.0

It is difficult to say with any certainty whether or not these tuition programs have had any effect. It may be argued that in a state like Connecticut, the strength figures would have been even lower without a tuition incentive. Figures on strength levels before FY 1983 were difficult to obtain uniformly, and most state assistance programs date back to the late 1970's.

It is interesting to note, however, that of the 19 states which overfulfilled their authorized strengths, 36% of them have no state-funded recruitment incentives of any kind. Only two have full tuition programs, and the rest offer incentives ranging from a small loan to cash assistance of about \$1000. This would indicate that the problems of recruitment are far more complex than a simple matter of money or education.

3. Recruitment obstacles

Discussions with Massachusetts ARNG recruiters, as well as a look at the obvious underutilization of the Commonwealth's educational assistance program, reveals the nature of the recruitment problem in Massachusetts.

4. Image

In many areas of the Commonwealth, military service is looked upon with open disparagement. This problem is particularly strong in suburban areas around metropolitan Boston, and somewhat lesser in western and southeastern parts of the state. One recruiter summed up this image problem when he discussed the reactions Guard recruiters get from the public when they appear in uniform: "In Lexington, they'll stare at us; in Fall River, they'll want to buy us a drink."

In contrast, the southern United States has had a long tradition of military service, and this is reflected in their strength levels. More than half of the states which overfulfilled their target strength levels are in the South, and no Southern state is at less than 98% of its authorized level. It is also possible that this phenomenon is related to economic problems in these and other rural states; the relationship between the economy and recruitment will be discussed in more detail.

Finally, there is the fact that the Massachusetts ARNG is primarily a combat infantry organization. Infantry holds little attraction for some recruits, since the training is perceived as inapplicable outside of military life. It is also considered one of the less glamorous branches of the Army, and it is therefore more difficult to use as an enticement to a prospective enlistee.

5. Recruitment, the economy, and demography

There is little reason to doubt the conventional wisdom which links unemployment figures to military recruitment. HPAO decided to look into this connection in order to present the problem of ARNG recruitment in more depth. Since most of the states provided figures on strength as of 1984, HPAO looked at national unemployment for FY 1983. Table 4 presents these figures.

Table 4
Strength Levels and Unemployment

1st rank: 101.0-124.1% of authorized strength (19 states)		
<u>State</u>	<u>% of authorized strength</u>	<u>1983 unemployment</u> ^a
North Dakota	124.1	5.6
Maryland	111.0	6.9
South Carolina	109.9	10.0
Michigan	109.7	14.2
Kentucky	109.6	11.7
Utah	108.4	9.2
Vermont	107.9	6.9
Georgia	106.1	7.5
South Dakota	105.6	5.4
Tennessee	105.0	11.5
Louisiana	104.6	11.8
Montana	104.1	8.8
North Carolina	103.9	8.9
Alabama	102.8	13.7
Mississippi	102.5	12.6
New York	102.4	8.6
Texas	101.7	8.0
Indiana	101.2	18.0
West Virginia	100.7	11.5
Average	106.4	10.0

2nd Rank: 96.0-99.7% of authorized strength (9 states)

Hawaii	99.5	6.5
Nevada	98.4	9.8
Maine	98.4	9.0
Florida	97.9	8.6
Ohio	97.4	12.2
Pennsylvania	97.2	11.8
Alaska	97.1	10.3
New Mexico	96.4	10.1
Illinois	96.1	11.4
Average	97.6	10.0

3rd Rank: 84.0-95.9% of authorized strength (15 states)

California	95.7	9.7
Massachusetts	95.7	6.9
Arizona	95.6	9.1
Idaho	95.5	9.8
Missouri	94.9	9.9
Minnesota	94.7	8.2
Nebraska	93.7	5.7
Wisconsin	93.5	10.4
New Jersey	92.6	7.8
Delaware	92.0	8.1
Rhode Island	91.3	8.3
Iowa	90.4	8.1
New Hampshire	88.3	5.4
Kansas	84.4	6.1
Connecticut	84.0	6.0
Average	92.2	8.0

a) Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Obviously, one constant factor in Table 4 is unemployment. Of the 1st Rank states which exceeded the national unemployment rate, they did so by more than 3%; 47% of the 1st Rank states experienced double-digit unemployment in 1983. In contrast, only one of the 15 3rd Rank states exceeded the national unemployment rate, and of those 25% of the 3rd Rank states which exceeded the national unemployment average, they did so by an average of less than 1%. The 2nd Rank states, as might be expected, hover close to the national average for both strength levels and unemployment. Clearly, unemployment is good for recruiting. Ironically, one of the major obstacles to Massachusetts ARNG recruiting is also one of the Commonwealth's strongest assets: its healthy economy.

Another interesting characteristic of Table 4 is its distinction according to population density. Sparse, largely rural states still attain high strength levels even if they do not experience heavy unemployment, probably because military service may seem to be a source of opportunity otherwise denied by lack of proximity to a large urban area. Of the 10 most densely populated states in the Union, 5 are 3rd Rank states, 3 are 2nd Rank, and 2 are 1st Rank. At the other end of the scale, the statistics are reversed. Of the 10 least populated states, 4 are 1st Rank states, 4 are 2nd Rank, and 2 are 3rd Rank (one state was not an HPAO questionnaire respondent). This is illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5

Population Density and Strength Levels
(Selected data)

<u>10 least dense states</u>	<u>% of authorized strength</u>
Alaska	97.1
Montana	104.1
Wyoming	--
Nevada	98.4
North Dakota	124.1
South Dakota	105.6
New Mexico	96.4
Idaho	95.5
Utah	108.4
Nebraska	93.7
Average	102.6
<u>10 most dense states</u>	<u>% of authorized strength</u>
New Jersey	92.6
Rhode Island	91.3
Massachusetts	95.7
Connecticut	84.0
Maryland	111.0
New York	102.4
Delaware	92.0
Pennsylvania	97.2
Ohio	97.4
Illinois	96.1
Average	96.0

6. Recruitment and Education

While there appears to be no shortage of officers in the Massachusetts ARNG, there is a problem with filling enlisted ranks. Again, the Commonwealth's blessing of high educational attainment may be the Massachusetts Guard's curse.

The dilemma is a simple one. If a large number of young people complete high school, they may go on to college, or to a growing number of employment opportunities requiring only a high school diploma. If they pursue higher education and become college graduates, then they will more likely choose to pursue a commission rather than an enlistment, if they indeed choose to join the military at all. Table 6 illustrates this relationship, using the highest and lowest ranking states in strength levels.

Table 6
Education and Strength Levels
(Selected data)

<u>State</u>	<u>% of authorized strength</u>	<u>% completing High School</u>	<u>% completing^a college</u>
North Dakota	124.1	66.4	14.8
Maryland	111.0	67.4	20.4
South Carolina	109.9	53.7	13.4
Michigan	109.7	68.0	14.3
Kentucky	109.6	53.1	11.1
Utah	108.4	80.0	19.9
Vermont	107.4	71.0	19.0
Georgia	106.1	56.4	14.6
South Dakota	105.6	67.9	14.0
Tennessee	105.0	56.2	12.6
Louisiana	104.6	57.7	13.9
Average	109.3	63.4	15.3
.....			
Connecticut	84.0	70.3	20.7
Kansas	84.4	73.3	17.0
New Hampshire	88.3	72.3	18.2
Iowa	90.4	71.5	13.9
Rhode Island	91.3	61.1	15.4
Delaware	92.0	68.6	17.5
New Jersey	92.6	67.4	18.3
Wisconsin	93.3	69.6	14.8
Nebraska	93.7	73.4	15.5
Minnesota	94.7	73.1	17.4
Missouri	94.9	63.5	13.9
Average	90.0	69.5	16.6
Massachusetts	95.7	72.2	20.0
a) Percent of population 25 years old or older			
Source: U.S. Census Bureau			

C. Recruitment: conclusions

Naturally, there are other factors which affect National Guard recruitment in Massachusetts and across the country which are not treated here. Some states have more active military sites than others, leading to a swelling of Guard ranks when active duty personnel leave the regular military and settle near their former bases. It is also possible that some states have more attractive opportunities than others due to their Guard's mission. These factors, as well as the influence of image, demography and economics, affect the recruiting picture as a whole.

However, Massachusetts' recruiting troubles are, in large part, a result of the Commonwealth's overall situation. In other words, Massachusetts recruiters are faced with the task of trying to enlist urbanized, fairly cosmopolitan young people, with relatively easy access to the opportunities available in metropolitan areas, into an outfit which can guarantee them only a state college education and infantry training. This leads to the kind of situation related by one Massachusetts ARNG recruiter who, when calling a prospective enlistee, was told by the young man's mother that "unless he could beat four years at Yale and a lucrative law practice afterward," her son wasn't interested.

Compounding this problem is the belief among many citizens in the Commonwealth that military service is to be looked down upon. Recruiters often encounter difficulty in attempting to enter high schools or in obtaining lists of seniors. While the number of ARNG recruiters has grown over the years from a handful to over 100, the recruiting process in Massachusetts still relies on word-of-mouth and personal references.

D. Recommendations

Perhaps the most effective steps which could be taken to aid Massachusetts ARNG recruiting would be steps to improve the image of military service in the Commonwealth. The National Guard in Massachusetts must somehow appeal to prospective enlistees with incentives other than money or education, both of which currently abound in the Commonwealth, at least to the degree that most young people do not feel compelled to join the Guard for economic reasons. A public campaign, designed to improve the image of the National Guard, could go a long way towards alleviating recruitment problems in the Commonwealth.

One possibility mentioned to HPAO interviewers by ARNG recruiters was to stress the more combat-oriented aspects of military service. While some recruiters feel that military discipline and combat training hinder recruitment, others believe quite strongly that such aspects of the Army are what draw in young people who would not otherwise join. As one recruiter put it: "Once we loosen up on the pure soldiering, we lose them. They don't want to be in the classroom; they want to be soldiers, even if only part-time." Thus, improved advertising seems to be in order. The Guard must build a positive image for itself in the Commonwealth, based not only on military service as a source of money and education, but also as a source of excitement and genuine combat training.

Another, more simple remedy, is to remove many of the barriers placed before recruiters. A problem expressed by recruiters in all parts of the state was lack of access to graduating high school students. Legislation requiring public high schools in Massachusetts to send lists of its graduating students to Massachusetts ARNG recruiters would go a long way towards solving this problem. The drawback here is that the legislation will be criticized as intrusive by groups who have been traditional opponents of military service, and it may generate too much negative publicity to be effective.

E. Retention

The problems of recruitment and retention are, of course, inextricably linked, and much of what was said under the section on recruitment may be considered as having an impact also on retention. However, there are a few aspects of the retention problem which merit separate consideration.

One problem is beyond the Commonwealth's power to correct, but should at least be mentioned here. This is the problem of a dual pay structure in the full-time Guard. Some members, especially those in administrative or specialist positions, are paid according to Federal GS ranks, while other members are paid according to a military pay scale. This causes friction among the members, since disparities may arise from this situation. HPAO interviewers were told of specific instances in which Guard members resigned due to their frustration with this situation. Unfortunately, the resolution of this problem lies entirely in Federal hands.

Naturally, the problem of retention is similar to the problem of recruitment in that it is bound up in questions of image and discipline. A unit which is sent into the field often, and allowed to flex their muscles, so to speak, is said by ARNG personnel to be a unit which will suffer little attrition. It is widely agreed by Guard NCOs that long, dull indoor drills are the quickest way to lose personnel.

While it is not the intention of HPAO to evaluate military practice and training, it should be said that if it is possible to spend more time drilling Guardsmen in field exercises which they find desirable, then an effort should be made to do so. As Massachusetts forces are essentially infantry, light armor, light infantry and combat support, this does not seem unreasonable. Classroom and indoor drills may be necessary, but they could be streamlined in order to lessen the time spent inside instead of in the field. One example of this is the paperwork one must master to report the sighting of a nuclear detonation. More than a page of detail is required to report an explosion of an enemy weapon, and one can hardly blame a National Guardsman for becoming quickly bored if his weekend duty is spent learning to master such data.

In a significant way, retention is aided by the tuition waiver granted by the state. While Federal bonuses of approximately \$1800 do exist, they are one-time cash bonuses. With the state tuition waiver, a Guardsman might very well reenlist in order to finish his schooling. This is especially true with prior service enlistees, who are obligated to enlist for only one year. This way, the Guardsman might stay an additional three years, until he has completed a bachelor's degree.

Retention is a difficult subject, because there will always be those who are disillusioned after initiation into Army life, others who choose to move away, and so on. Much relies on internal efforts by the Guard. A few unit administrators told HPAO interviewers that they had never seen or met the NCO responsible for retention in their area, even though such NCOs are displayed on large posters in each armory. This is a problem of discipline, rather than a failing of the program or its individual supports.

One glaring fault of the system, however, is the handling of members who do not attend drills (i.e., are AWOL), and who are subsequently discharged from the Guard. Technically, a Guardsman who does not show up for drills or other activities can be arrested by state or local authorities, upon notification by ARNG officials. In practice, however, this is a rare occurrence, and the more likely possibility is that the unexcused absences will accrue until the member is discharged. Thus, a member who wishes to leave the Guard before the end of his enlistment has a very clear and viable option: stop coming. This, according to many NCOs, leads to a snowball effect. As members stop coming, others see that no real consequences (other than discharge) will result. Table 7 illustrates the number of Guardsmen discharged for AWOL violations in the past three years.

Table 7
Discharges for AWOL Violations

<u>Year</u>	<u>AWOL discharges</u>	<u>AWOLs as a % of total discharges</u>
1983	759	42 %
1984	510	34 %
1985	566	31 %
(to date)		

It is clear that this is a problem of serious proportions. What is less clear is the remedy to this problem, because it is difficult to know whether AWOL violations were the result of accepting recruits who should not be in the military, or of factors in the Guard itself.

One step would be to increase coordination between the ARNG and those local and state law-enforcement agencies responsible for arresting AWOLs. The General Laws provide for penalties which should be adequate to deter AWOL activity; the problem lies in getting to the point where the AWOL individual must face the consequences of this action. ARNG officials statewide have complained that local police forces are rarely cooperative in detaining AWOL soldiers. If this noncooperation can be remedied, and more Guardsmen are made examples of when they fail to report, it seems fair to expect that AWOL attrition will drop.

Coupled with stricter law enforcement, a more selective recruitment plan may alleviate the AWOL problem. The New York National Guard, for one, has reported a significant decline in the number of Guardsmen lost through failure to complete the six-year enlistment by improving the quality of new recruits through careful testing.¹ It is understood that this results in a dilemma of having to keep up recruitment while weeding out uncommitted enlistees. However, the goal is to improve overall strength, not volume of recruiting. If recruiters are accepting less qualified people simply to fill a quota, then this system should be replaced, as there is little point in dragging individuals in one door and then throwing them out of the other.

Finally, AWOL discharges should be classified as "dishonorable" rather than the less prejudicial "general" discharge, as is the current practice.

(1) Legislative Commission on Expenditure Review, National Guard Strength and Armories, (Albany: New York State Legislature, 1980), pp. 9-11

III. THE MASSACHUSETTS ARMORY SYSTEM

A. Background

The Massachusetts armory system exists by the authority of Chapter 33, Section 117 of the General Laws. The basic tasks of the armories are to provide areas for state forces to drill and train, and to serve as central points of activity during emergencies. Each armory generally houses a unit or units of similar purpose; i.e., a military police company, or a light infantry unit, and so on.

Massachusetts currently has 72 military facilities, of which 59 are state-owned armories and 13 are other facilities of various types in which Massachusetts National Guard units are stationed. These other facilities include sites such as Westover AFB and Camp Edwards. As all these facilities house state forces, they may be considered as armories for the purposes of this study, particularly since they all involve costs to the state in one form or another. This places the Commonwealth 10th in total number of armories as compared to the other respondents of the HPAO questionnaire, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8
Armory Facilities, By State
(selected data)

<u>State</u>	<u>no. of armories</u> ^a
Alabama	143
Texas	140
California	124
Mississippi	104
North Carolina	101
Pennsylvania	98
Tennessee	84
Ohio	81
South Carolina	80
Massachusetts	72
New York	70
Georgia	70
Minnesota	69
Indiana	68
Wisconsin	68
Kansas	64
Louisiana	64
Missouri	63
Iowa	56
Florida	55

a) Includes only those armories used for state National Guard purposes.

Clearly, armory facilities are not necessarily proportional to the size of the forces present in each state. Alabama ranks 1st in number of armories, but 4th in size of actual forces; New York is in 2nd place in force size, but 11th in number of armories. Table 9 divides the number of troops by the number of armories available for the 15 states with the most armories, providing an average population of troops per armory.

Table 9
Troops per Armory

<u>State</u>	<u>Troops per facility</u>
Alabama	146
Texas	138
California	206
Mississippi	116
North Carolina	119
Pennsylvania	224
Tennessee	160
Ohio	176
South Carolina	175
Massachusetts	214
New York	331
Georgia	157
Minnesota	142
Indiana	191
Wisconsin	127
Average for all respondents	173

A certain degree of caution must be used in evaluating interstate comparisons of armories, since each state may apply the term "armory" rather idiosyncratically; one state's "armory" might be another state's "drill shed". Alaska, for example, utilizes very small "scout armories" which, because of their small size and unique function, were not included in this study. Some Southern states attach the term "armory" to any structure in which the military can drill, even though such a structure may have no administrative offices or weapons repositories of any kind. It is believed that the figures used above refer primarily to armories in the sense described at the beginning of this section, i.e., structures which house National Guard units, their unit administrators, their equipment, and so on.

B. The Massachusetts Armory System


1. Distribution

The map on the following page indicates the placement of National Guard facilities throughout the Commonwealth. The age of each facility may be found in Appendix B. As is evident, there is an armory within a short distance of nearly every city and town on the Massachusetts mainland.

2. Age and Conditions

Among the respondents to the HPAO study, Massachusetts ranks 4th in age of armory facilities overall, and 2nd among the New England states, as shown in Table 10. Twenty-six of the Commonwealth's armories are over the national average armory age of 29 years.

Age, however, is not necessarily a problem in itself. Problems arise from lack of maintenance, wear and design, even in new buildings.



PLACEMENT OF NATIONAL
GUARD FACILITIES
THROUGHOUT MASSACHUSETTS

TABLE 10
Age of Armories

<u>State</u>	<u>Average Age</u>
Pennsylvania	60
New York	59
Connecticut	47
Massachusetts	45
Illinois	43
Rhode Island	43
Ohio	40
Michigan	39
Washington	35
Maryland	35
New Jersey	35
Maine	34
Minnesota	32
Nevada	30
California	30
North Dakota	30
Indiana	28
New Hampshire	27
Georgia	27
Iowa	27
Missouri	27
Alabama	26
Louisiana	26
Wisconsin	26
Florida	25
Montana	25
Utah	25
Nebraska	25
Kansas	25
Vermont	25
Mississippi	25
Texas	25
Tennessee	24
Arizona	23
West Virginia	22
Hawaii	22
North Carolina	21
South Carolina	20
Delaware	20
South Dakota	20
Kentucky	20
Alaska	16
Idaho	15
New Mexico	12
Average	29

After consultations with the State Quartermaster's Office, HPAO visited several armories. Overall, there are problems with both the conditions of the armories and the underutilization of these facilities. We will examine individual armories first, before proceeding to a more general discussion of recommendations. A measure of utilization used here is that of total utility costs divided by the number of troops at the facility. This may provide a yardstick for determining the cost efficiency of "running" each armory based on the average cost per member. Table 11 gives the complete data for all of the armories.

Table 11
Armory Costs, 1984

<u>Armory</u>	<u>Total utilities costs, 1984</u>	<u>Cost per member</u>
Commonwealth Ave (HQ)	193,225	108.07
Reading	37,651	60.53
Worcester/Salisbury St.	32,640	116.57
Dorchester	27,360	85.29
Holyoke	26,434	201.79
Lexington	26,344	134.41
New Bedford	25,667	103.08
Woburn	23,870	146.44
Fall River	22,132	57.34
Newburyport	21,648	160.36
Worcester/Lincoln St.	21,483	52.27
Danvers	20,999	132.91
Rehoboth	20,251	39.10
Chelsea	18,541	88.18
Gardner	18,807	118.28
Pittsfield	18,541	116.61
Webster	18,299	196.77
Cambridge	18,250	62.93
Lynn	18,222	53.60
Framingham	18,204	107.72
Stoughton	17,859	116.73
Somerville	17,511	236.64
Quincy	17,247	55.82
Bridgewater	16,489	122.14
Newton	16,254	99.11
Whitman	15,668	71.55
Westfield	15,118	92.19
Brockton	14,978	94.80
Bourne	14,640	443.66
Braintree	14,437	90.80
Weymouth	14,055	109.81
Hyannis	13,227	104.98

Table 11, continued

Wayland	\$ 12,520	\$ 100.79
Melrose	12,502	44.65
Ayer	12,487	63.07
Northampton	12,371	77.81
Chicopee	12,164	100.54
Middleboro	12,073	127.09
Concord	11,994	144.52
Malden	11,765	73.99
North Adams	11,664	73.36
Northbridge	11,631	82.49
Natick	11,519	104.73
Southbridge	11,364	164.70
Clinton	11,134	134.15
Leominster	11,110	90.33
Milford	10,721	68.29
Waltham	10,531	117.01
Greenfield	10,435	65.63
Agawam	10,195	64.13
Hingham	9,985	91.61
Ware	9,496	59.73
Natick/Speen St.	8,960	137.86
Adams	8,897	67.92
Marlboro	8,559	90.10
Hudson	8,223	99.07
Plymouth	7,220	100.29
Falmouth	5,996	132.91
Methuen	3,487	24.05
Taunton*	141	1.97
Average	17,300	99.31

* Utility costs shared with municipality.

Source: State Quartermaster, Military Division HQ

From this list the most underutilized armories may be identified.

Table 12
Ten Most Underutilized Armories

<u>Armory</u>	<u>Cost per member</u>
Bourne	443.66
Somerville	236.64
Holyoke	201.79
Webster	196.77
Southbridge	164.70
Newburyport	160.36
Woburn	146.44
Concord	144.52
Natick/Speen St.	137.86
Lexington	134.41

C. Facilities

The armories examined by HPAO staff were Holyoke, Agawam, Springfield, Worcester/Lincoln St., Worcester/Salisbury St., Marlboro, Methuen and Plymouth.

1. Holyoke

Holyoke was one of the most structurally deteriorated of the armories examined. Built in 1906, it is situated on Sargent St. Unit personnel administrators estimate that 50-60% of the unit's 132 members live so close to the armory that they walk to drills. In terms of maintaining strength, this is an advantage. Indeed, the combat-support company of the 104th infantry which is stationed there is only 8 members short of a full complement.

1-1. The Holyoke Armory (1906)



The major problems at Holyoke are structural. Much of the building was renovated in 1969, including all of the electrical wiring, but there are evident problems with the masonry both inside and outside the building. Illustration 1-2 shows a section of brick over the main entrance. This area has been repaired previously, but moisture is again creating a possible safety hazard from falling mortar and loosened brick.

1-2. Facade brickwork, Holyoke



A similar masonry problem exists all around the exterior of the building, as is apparent in Illustration 1-3. This line of water seepage is a source of leakage into the building; Illustration 1-4 shows one such area within the armory.

1-3. East wall, Holyoke



1-4. Lower level hallway, Holyoke



While Holyoke may be large enough to accomodate a unit of the size it should hold, its facilities are poor. The lower level contains the cafeteria, the kitchen, various storage areas for weapons, radios and other gear, squad rooms and lavatories. All of these areas are rather dilapidated. It should be noted that this is not a fault of those responsible for maintaining the area; rather, it is simply the result of almost 80 years of military use and New England weather. The wooden floors, as might be expected, are warped, and cracked plaster is evident everywhere. There are areas which basically fall apart from time to time, such as the ceiling in a storage room shown in Illustration 1-5.

1-5. Storage room ceiling, Holyoke



The second floor of the Holyoke armory is also in poor condition, as the classroom shown in Illustration 1-6 attests. This particular classroom is in the process of being renovated under a self-help program in which the labor is provided by members of the unit. The cost of materials to repair this room will be approximately \$700.

1-6. Classroom, Holyoke



In addition to these structural problems, Holyoke is very expensive to run. The armory's total utility costs for 1984, according to the State Quartermaster, were \$26,434, making it the 5th most costly armory in terms of such expenditures. One reason for this high figure is the fact that the armory must buy steam from the City of Holyoke. The size of the Holyoke facility makes it expensive to heat, and this no doubt contributes to large utility costs. Also, according to the cost-per-member measurement, Holyoke is rather underutilized; it ranks 3rd on the list of underutilized armories, at a cost of \$201.79 per member in 1984.

Like the other Western Massachusetts armories, Holyoke keeps its vehicles at the Westfield armory. While this may increase fuel costs as Guardsmen drive their military vehicles back and forth to Westfield once per month, there is no viable alternative. Holyoke's vehicle bay, cluttered with low-hanging pipes, barely accomodates one vehicle.

The major civic use of the armory is by Holyoke Community College, which pays for the use of the armory's basketball court (See Appendix C for schedule of armory usage fees). This is a fairly regular activity during the winter; otherwise the facility is used once a month for drills and one weekday night from time to time for administrative matters.

2. Agawam

The Agawam armory is situated on Maynard St., in the residential Feeding Hills area. Home to a light infantry unit, the facility was built in 1961 and is in generally good condition.

2-1. The Agawam Armory (1961)



2-2. Drill Area, Agawam



Agawam is well-maintained, although certain problems do exist. The facility's heat pump had to be replaced recently, at a cost of \$1252. This is not unusual, as the pump being replaced had been installed in the armory when the structure was built 25 years ago. Also, there is a serious leakage problem. The storage area is quite damp and musty, and moisture is seeping in and getting to wiring and plaster, as shown in Illustration 2-3.

2-3. Lighting in storage area, Agawam



Total utility costs at Agawam for 1984 were \$10,195; cost-per-member was low, at \$64.13. While this is efficient in a monetary sense, the armory is inefficient in that very few members of the unit are from the Agawam community. If the purpose of having an armory in almost every town is to foster units from a community area, then the Agawam armory is not particularly necessary; most of its members are from areas which are already served by an armory.

The Agawam armorer indicated that there is very little civic use of the armory because of the high costs of insurance required for outside groups wishing to use the facility. While the armory is open for civic use, very few groups have the money to finance the insurance costs, and actual use is almost nil. Of course, military use occurs once per month, as well as the assorted occasional weeknight administrative drills.

3. Springfield

HPAO visited the Springfield armory in order to contrast a large multi-unit armory with the smaller and older armories. Springfield is a large, modern building, well placed near an industrial park on Roosevelt Avenue.

3-1. The Springfield armory (1984)



Four units are housed at Springfield, with each holding activities in rotation with the others. As may be seen, the cafeteria, classrooms and vehicle/drill areas are all quite spacious.

3-2. Cafeteria, Springfield



3-3. Classroom, Springfield



Since the facility is new, there is no data as yet on its efficiency. Initial experience among some ARNG members indicates a great deal of satisfaction. The old Springfield Armory, on Federal Street, has since been turned over to the city.

4. Worcester/Salisbury St.

The older of Worcester's two armories sits only a short walk from downtown Worcester. Built in 1891, it suffers the problems which usually plague so old a structure, from the cracked, unusable flagpoles, to water seepage in various areas. It must be said, however, that the building is in better condition than might be expected.

4-1. The Worcester Armory, Salisbury St. (1891)



The Salisbury St. armory must accommodate two company-sized units, which it appears capable of doing. However, many of the facilities are outdated; the locker rooms are cramped and dusty, with the lockers in varying states of disrepair.

As was the case in Agawam, Salisbury St. does not have a working emergency door, as it is chained shut due to rot on the bottom and edges of the doors. A Salisbury St. officer indicated to HPAO interviewers that there were fears that a break-in was possible.

4-2. Ceiling disrepair, Salisbury St.



While the building for the most part is structurally sound, officials at Salisbury St. have reported problems with the boiler, which apparently breaks down 4 to 5 times every winter. Total utilities costs for the facility in 1984 were \$32,640, making it the third most expensive armory in this category. Cost-per-member was acceptable, at an average of \$116.57.

Salisbury St. officials report a nearly constant public use of the Gymnasium for various team sports. Guard use is the basic once a month drill, plus administrative evenings from time to time.

5. Worcester/Lincoln St.

Built in 1963, Worcester's Lincoln St. armory is in generally excellent condition. The problem at Lincoln St. is not condition, but space.

5-1. The Worcester Armory, Lincoln St. (1963)



Originally intended to house 3 units of 85 men each, Lincoln St. must now hold 3 units of 140 men each. Unit administrators expressed concern over storage space, maintenance space, and locker areas. HPAO found storage to be packed and overcrowded, although not dangerously.

Lincoln St. ranked 11th in utilities costs in 1984, with the total costs at \$21,483. Cost-per-member was very good, at \$52.27. This indicates the efficiency of multi-unit basing, since the facility is used by more Guardsmen more times per month than a single unit armory. There is no significant public utilization of the Lincoln St. facility.

6. Marlboro

The Marlboro armory is a seriously dilapidated structure, abounding with leaks, structural problems and fire hazards. While equal to the Holyoke armory in age, it is in much worse condition. Situated on Lincoln St. near the center of town, the armory is the home of a supply and transport company.

6-1. The Marlboro Armory (1906)



Water leakage is a serious problem at Marlboro, with the wooden roof slowly being destroyed by the moisture, as may be seen in Illustration 6-2.

6-2. Roof, Marlboro



The basement has not escaped water damage, either. Marlboro's storage areas are damp and mildewed, and the mortar is clearly deteriorating from the moisture.

6-3. Basement, Marlboro



While Marlboro does have a kitchen area, as seen in Illustration 6-4, the equipment is not functional, and has not worked for years.

6-4. Kitchen, Marlboro (non-functioning)





The emergency exit from the Marlboro armory is located at the rear of the building. The stairs which lead down from it are rotted out and unusable, and the exit itself is neither useful as an exit (it has been officially condemned) or as a locked entryway, since the door frame is in poor condition. This is not only a security problem, but it creates a serious fire hazard. The entire building, like some of the other, older armories, is essentially a mass of old, dry wood. There are no sprinklers, and as has been pointed out, no emergency exit.

While dilapidated, Marlboro is at least efficient. A small building, the armory's utility costs were a total of \$8,559 in 1984, placing it near the bottom of the list. Cost-per-member was average, at \$90.10. Unit administrators said the town of Marlboro uses the facility from time to time, mostly for events such as elections.

7. Methuen

The Methuen armory was built in 1913 to house a cavalry unit. The horses are gone now, but some vestiges of their former presence remain, including the slanted floors on the lower level, designed to accomodate the horses' waste when indoors. Despite this small idiosyncrasy, and a few other minor repair problems, the Methuen facility appears to be in very good condition.

7-1. The Methuen Armory (1913)



The building itself is quite small, although there is a large vehicle area outside the armory which is operated by the U.S. Government (Illustration 7-2). The interior of the building is carefully and expertly maintained.

7-2. Vehicle area behind Methuen Armory



Methuen has only one serious repair problem: leaky masonry on the roof. This has led to a deterioration of the upstairs activity room at the armory.

The downstairs recreation area is rather underutilized. The floors are slanted (because of the horses), and they are cracked and fissured in places. The room is not unusable, but the floor is clearly in need of repairs.

Methuen is the least expensive and most efficient armory in the system. Only Taunton reported lower utility costs in 1984, and it must be remembered that Taunton shares its armory with the local police. Methuen's total utility expenditures in 1984 came to \$3,487. The cost-per-member was also the lowest in the state (again, excluding Taunton), at \$24.05, over \$75.00 below the state average.

According to Methuen administrators, the only public use of the facility occurs when the Merrimack River overflows its banks. The armory is situated almost directly on the river, and it has been used to shelter families threatened by the flood waters, as well as providing a center of operations for relief agencies.

Methuen recruiters pointed out that the area is an excellent one for recruiting, and that the armory is rarely understaffed. They attribute this in large part to the support given to the Guard by surrounding communities.

8. Plymouth

The Plymouth armory is one of the smaller armories of the Commonwealth. It currently houses 2 platoons of a military police unit, with the rest of the unit based in Taunton. The building was constructed in 1910.

8-1. The Plymouth Armory (1910)



As with all of the older armories, water is the main enemy at Plymouth. It is seeping into the basement, leaking through the roof, and soaking through the walls, as the following illustrations demonstrate.

8-2. Roof, Plymouth



The basement is especially hard-hit. The Plymouth armorer keeps a dehumidifier on the lower storage area day and night, although the effect seems to be negligible. The Plymouth basement is characterized by overpowering mildew and dampness. Fortunately, the weapons storage area appears to be both dry and adequately secure.

8-3. Basement, Plymouth



The source of much of this leakage is two structures outside the building which are unidentifiable. At first glance, they appear to be antiquated coal chutes. This is not the case, as the actual chutes leading to the original coal bin are easily discerned. Whatever they are, they provide a direct access for water leaking into the basement.

Other structure problems are evident in Plymouth. Yet again, HPAO found an old wooden armory with no effective emergency exit. The door frame on the exit at Plymouth has rotted, and the door has had to be nailed and braced in order to provide for the security of the building.

The outside masonry, like that at Holyoke, is coming apart over the entrance, due to moisture. This could become a serious safety hazard.

While Plymouth has very low utility costs (\$7,220 in 1984), it is only of average utilization efficiency, with cost-per-member at \$100.29. Of the 75 Guardsmen assigned to Plymouth, only 6 are actually from the city itself, and the 2 Plymouth platoons could no doubt fit at the Taunton facility if the Taunton police were not there.

D. An Overabundance of Armories

The most salient feature of the Massachusetts armory system is its size. Simply put, Massachusetts has many more armories than it actually needs. The Commonwealth's system consists of many small, inefficient, decaying buildings, placed in communities whose best use for the structure is for the local basketball team or amateur drama production.

The logical alternative to this proliferation of small armories is a system of streamlined regionalization. This was put forth by the authors of Senate report S.1480 in 1974:

"This subcommittee believes that action must be taken to relocate units currently stationed in archaic Armories into more modern facilities whenever practical and feasible...

To achieve this objective, we see a need to develop a [multifaceted] program:

....Vacating old Armories by consolidation of units.

....Establishing regional Armories designed to serve a geographic area rather than a specific City or Town."(2)

(2) S.1480, Massachusetts Senate, (Boston: Comm. of Mass., 1974), p.146.

HPAO recognizes, as did S.1480, that old facilities cannot be vacated without the creation of new ones. State National Guard officials are quite sure that there is currently an abundance of Federal Funds for the construction necessary to build new armories, under the established formula of 75% Federal/25% State funding of armory construction.

The State Quartermaster, in cooperation with the Defense Department, would be the source of actual plans for new regional armories and HPAO will not presume to engage in military planning. However, certain possibilities should be recognized.

As the State Quartermaster's office itself has pointed out, a new Taunton armory is still in the design stage. Like Springfield, it will be built on land given to the state by the city in exchange for the old Taunton armory. It seems logical to reunite the two Plymouth platoons with their own HQ units, now based in Taunton. Indeed, it may be possible to consolidate Middleborough into a large enough Taunton facility. Springfield is not that large a structure, and it holds four units. Since few Plymouth Guardsmen live in Plymouth, and Middleborough borders Taunton, it does not seem unfair to ask members assigned to these armories to switch to Taunton.

Likewise, Federal construction of an armory on Camp Edwards would allow closing Bourne, the most inefficiently utilized armory in the Commonwealth, as well as Hyannis and Falmouth.

A new facility in Lynn would allow for the permanent relocation of units displaced by the fire at the Salem armory, as well as the closing or transfer of the 94 year old building currently housing Lynn members.

Other examples are easily found. A new armory in the Holyoke area would allow the closing of the Agawam armory, very few of whose members are from Agawam anyway. The drive from Agawam to Holyoke is not excessive, as may be seen on the map.

E. The Importance of Planning

The Commonwealth's armory system suffers from a common flaw of American public policy: incrementalism. Rather than grapple with the problem head-on, as S.1480 boldly suggested 11 years ago, the Commonwealth has chosen to patch up an armory here and there, and then build a new one only under dire conditions. Springfield's old Federal Street armory was replaced when it had finally become so decrepit that there was no alternative. This is not planning; rather, it is expensive and inefficient "damage-limiting" behavior.

Other states have acted on this issue. Some states have simply closed many armories, while others have chosen to complement their systems with combinations of construction and closings.

Table 13
Armory Construction since 1975
(selected data)

<u>State</u>	<u>armories closed</u> <u>since '75</u>	<u>armories built</u> <u>since '75</u>
South Carolina	20	20
North Carolina	18	17
Ohio	17	4
Tennessee	14	28
New Jersey	7	3
New York	6	1
Mississippi	8	15
Alabama	1	28

In order to provide for the smooth continuity of the Massachusetts armory system, the Legislature is going to have to address certain key issues:

1. The purpose of an armory is to provide for the maintainance of military forces, not to provide cheap basketball facilities to local high schools and community colleges. If it does not serve the purposes of the State and Federal missions of the Guard, then it has no point existing as an "armory."

2. The "you can pay now, or you can pay later" syndrome. Regardless of the General Court's present feelings about new armories and their benefits or drawbacks, the simple fact is that the Commonwealth is going to have a new system of armories one way or another, because many of the present armories will soon collapse. The essential question is whether armory construction will continue to be done as a piecemeal, stopgap activity, or as a coherent, long-term, well-planned project. It may be argued that Massachusetts has a special obligation to think about this question in light of the important, combat-oriented mission it may be called to one day fulfill in Federal service.

F. The Advantages of Regionalizing

The argument for regionalization is based on simple efficiency. It makes no sense to put one small unit in an old, expensive, dilapidated building, where it will be used once per month, when the same unit could share a new facility with three other units. The building would then be in almost constant use, and therefore much more efficient.

Under the existing system, as old armories decay, units will end up sharing cramped quarters. A sensible regionalization plan would smoothly integrate several units statewide, rather than have them be forced upon each other as necessity may from time to time dictate. Militarily, units reporting to one area are easier to mobilize than units reporting to small, scattered points throughout the state.

Regionalizing will save money, aggravation and disorder. Newer facilities may also have beneficial, but less tangible, effects on morale, recruitment and proficiency.

HOUSE POST AUDIT AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
Room 146 State House
Boston, Massachusetts 02133

NATIONAL GUARD QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

The following questions are designed to assist Massachusetts in evaluating the impact of incentive programs on National Guard strength levels, the effectiveness of retention and/or recruitment bonuses, and the general condition and usage of armories in relation to other states. If you have any additional or clarifying information that you feel is necessary to fully answer a question, please use the back of sheets.

1. What is your State's National Guard:
 - _____ a. Actual strength as of 12/31/84 _____
 - _____ b. Authorized strength level as of 12/31/84 _____

2. Does your State provide funding for any of the following incentive programs for National Guard members?

<u>Program</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
College Tuition Assistance	_____	_____
Recruitment bonus	_____	_____
Retention bonus	_____	_____

3. In what year was the college tuition assistance program for National Guardsmen first funded by your State? _____

4. What is the maximum annual tuition grant or maximum annual percentage of tuition waived?

Maximum Tuition Grant: \$ _____ per year,

Maximum percentage or tuition waived: _____ percent per year.

5. Are officers and enlisted members eligible for the college tuition assistance program?
 - _____ Both are eligible.
 - _____ Only enlisted are eligible.
 - _____ Only officers are eligible.

6. During federal fiscal year 1984, what number and percentage of Army National Guardsmen were eligible for the tuition assistance program?
 - _____ number participating.
 - _____ percentage of total eligible.

7. Is the college tuition assistance program limited to certain schools within your State?

_____ No, any college may be selected.

_____ Yes, only colleges within the State may be selected.

_____ Yes, only public supported colleges within the State may be selected.

8. a. Does participation in the college tuition assistance program require a member to incur an additional National Guard service commitment?

_____ Yes

_____ No

b. If yes, what is the commitment incurred for participation?

9. Overall, how effective would you rate the tuition assistance program in the following categories as it applies to the Army National Guard:

	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>	<u>Effec- tive</u>	<u>Not Effec- tive</u>	<u>Do Not Know</u>	<u>Not Applic- able</u>
Increasing Recruitment	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Increasing Retention	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Decreasing Losses	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Increasing Recruit Quality	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

10. In what year were the recruitment and/or retention bonuses first funded in your State?

_____ Recruitment Bonus

_____ Retention Bonus

11. Are recruitment and/or retention bonuses funded by your State limited to certain specific units, MOS or rank?

_____ Yes

_____ No

12. What is the maximum dollar eligibility for recruitment and/or retention bonus?

\$ _____ Recruitment bonus maximum or range

\$ _____ Retention bonus maximum or range

13. Overall, how effective would you rate the bonuses in increasing ARNG strength levels?

	<u>Very Effec- tive</u>	<u>Effec- tive</u>	<u>Not Effec- tive</u>	<u>Do Not Know</u>	<u>Not Applic- able</u>
Recruitment bonus	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Retention bonus	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

14. Is your State planning any significant new programs to attract and retain members of the National Guard?

_____ Yes

_____ No

15. During federal fiscal year 1979 (for the ARNG only) how many retention and recruitment bonuses were given and what was the total dollar value of the bonuses?

Retention

Recruitment

_____ Number of bonuses.

_____ Number of bonuses.

_____ Total dollar value
\$ _____ of bonuses.

_____ Total dollar value
\$ _____ of bonuses.

16. Your State's National Guard armory characteristics ending in 1984.

_____ Number of armories.

_____ Number of armories utilized by National Guard.

_____ Average age of armories.

_____ Number of armories closed in the past ten years.

_____ Number of armories constructed in the past ten years.

_____ Percent of new armories constructed to replace old armories.

17. Does your State encourage the civilian utilization of the armories?

_____ Yes

_____ No

18. Does your State charge rental fees for the civilian use of the armories?

_____ Yes

_____ No

19. Do rental fees, or a portion of rental fees, revert to the rented armory?

_____ All rental fees revert to the armory.

_____ A percentage of rental fees is returned to the armory.
_____ Percent.

_____ All rental fees revert to the State treasury.

_____ Other (please explain).

State: _____

Name: _____

Title: _____

Phone # () _____

Appendix B

Dates of Construction of Massachusetts Armories

<u>City</u>	<u>Year Constructed</u>		
Springfield	1984		
Reading	1973		
Northampton	1969		
Danvers	1968		
Lexington	1964		
Ayer	1964		
Weymouth	1963		
Worcester/Lincoln St.	1963		
Stoughton	1962		
Pittsfield	1962		
Brockton	1962		
Whitman	1961		
Agawam	1961		
Southbridge	1960		
Leominster	1960		
Fitchburg/Municipal Airport	1960		
Bridgewater	1960		
Cambridge	1960		
Framingham	1959		
Northbridge	1958		
Hyannis	1958		
Fall River	1958		
Falmouth	1958		
Chelsea	1957		
Ware	1957		
Webster	1957		
Middleboro	1957		
Newburyport	1957		
Gardner	1957		
Chicopee	1957		
Dorchester	1957		
Bourne	1957		
Braintree	1957		
Melrose	1956		
Wayland	1955		
Rehoboth	1955		
Westfield	1935		
Natick/Speen St.	1930		
North Adams	1930		
		<u>City</u>	<u>Year Constructed</u>
		Quincy	1924
		Taunton	1917
		Woburn	1917
		Concord	1915
		Clinton	1914
		Adams	1914
		Methuen	1913
		Boston	1913
		Milford	1912
		Natick	1912
		Newton	1910
		Plymouth	1910
		Greenfield	1910
		Hudson	1910
		Hingham	1909
		Waltham	1908
		Malden	1908
		Marlboro	1906
		Holyoke	1906
		New Bedford	1905
		Somerville	1903
		Lynn	1893
		Worcester/Grove St.	1891

Appendix C

Fees for Armory Usage

Massachusetts, like 15 other states in the HPAO sample, demands that all armory fees be deposited with the state treasurer. Many other states either deposit fees directly with the unit, or split the fees with the state. Once deposited with the state, some fees revert to their respective military budgets, while others may be considered general revenue. Policy varies widely from state to state.

Massachusetts divides its armories, for the sake of a fee structure, into three classes. Only the Commonwealth Armory in Boston is a Class A armory. The Class B armories are as follows: Cambridge, Dorchester, Fall River, Melrose, Springfield, Worcester/Salisbury St., Worcester/Lincoln St., Reading, Lynn, and New Bedford.

The fees are divided by activities. Most activities, from public meetings and drum corps drills to high school athletics, cost \$10/hour at a Class A armory, \$7/hour at a Class B, and \$6/hour at a Class C. Beano and similar operations cost \$75, \$30, and \$20 per hour at a Class A, B, or C armory, respectively.

Major athletic events, flea markets and other such activities are charged a \$1500 daily rate at the Commonwealth Armory, and \$25 and \$20 per hour at a Class B and Class C armory, respectively.

The money received for the use of an armory is deposited with the State Treasury, which then directs the money into a fund used for armory maintainance and operations statewide.

Waivers may be obtained for certain senior groups, law enforcement agencies and others. A full list of all pertinent regulations and waivers may be found in Massachusetts National Guard pamphlet TAGMA 700-1.

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